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Jennifer Lackey

Wayne and Elizabeth Jones Professor of Philosophy

Ph.D. Brown University

Jennifer Lackey specializes in epistemology, with a particular emphasis on a broad range of issues in social epistemology. Her recent work focuses on false confessions, the criminal justice system, the duty to object, norms of credibility, the epistemic status of punishment, the epistemology of groups, expertise, and the distribution of epistemic goods. She is the author of Learning from Words: Testimony as a Source of Knowledge (2008, Oxford: Oxford University Press) and has co-edited (with Ernest Sosa) The Epistemology of Testimony (2006, Oxford University Press) and (with David Christensen) The Epistemology of Disagreement (2013, Oxford University Press). She has also edited Academic Freedom (2018) and Essays in Collective Epistemology (2014). She is the recipient of the Dr. Martin R. Lebowitz and Eve Lewellis Lebowitz Prize for Philosophical Achievement and Contribution (2014-2015), a Mellon Foundation Grant for a Sawyer Seminar (2014-2015), and a Charles A. Ryskamp Research Fellowship through the American Council of Learned Societies (2007-2008). She is also a winner of the Young Epistemologist Prize (2005). She is Editor-in-Chief of Episteme, Editor of Philosophical Studies, and Subject Editor for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.  

Selection of Recent Articles:

  • “False Confessions and Testimonial Injustice,” forthcoming in the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology.
  • “The Total Evidence View of the Epistemology of Sexual Consent,” forthcoming in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Applied Epistemology. (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
  • “Punishment and Transformation,” forthcoming in Enoch Lambert and John Schwenkler (eds.), Becoming Someone New: Essays on Transformative Experience, Choice, and Change (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
  • “When Should We Disagree About Politics?” forthcoming in Elizabeth Edenberg and Michael Hannon (eds.), Political Epistemology.
  • “The Duty to Object,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research (2018): doi: 10.1111/phpr.12563.
  • “Credibility and the Distribution of Epistemic Goods,” in Kevin McCain (ed.), Believing in Accordance with the Evidence: New Essays on Evidentialism. (Springer Publishing, 2018): 145–168.
  • “Academic Freedom,” in Jennifer Lackey (ed.), Academic Freedom. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 3–20.
  • “Silence and Objecting,” in Casey Johnson (ed.), Voicing Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public. (Routledge, 2018): 82–96.
  • “Group Lies,” in Eliot Michaelson and Andreas Stokke (eds.), Lying: Language, Knowledge, Ethics, Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 262–284.
  • “Experts and Peer Disagreement,” in Matthew Benton, John Hawthorne, and Dani Rabinowitz (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and God: New Insights in Religious Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018): 228–245.
  • “Group Assertion.” Erkenntnis 83 (2018): 21–42.
  • “Norms of Credibility.” American Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2017): 323–337.
  • “What Is Justified Group Belief?” The Philosophical Review 125 (2016): 341–396.

Selection of Recent Public Engagement: