

KYLA EBELS-DUGGAN

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ACADEMIC POSITIONS

Associate Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2013-present
Director of Graduate Studies, 2018-present
Acting Director, Brady Program in Ethics and Civic Life, 2016-2017
Visiting Associate Professor, University of Chicago, Winter 2017
Senior Fellow, Center for Ethics and Education, Wisconsin Center for Education Research, 2015-present
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Northwestern University, 2007-2013
Laurance S. Rockefeller Visiting Fellow, Center for Human Values, Princeton University, 2009-2010
Weinberg College Fellow (Tenure Track Position), Northwestern University, 2006-2007

EDUCATION

Harvard University, Ph.D., Philosophy, March 2007
Dissertation: *Giving Reasons: Interpersonal Relationships and the Conditions of Autonomy*
Committee: Christine M. Korsgaard (chair), T.M. Scanlon, Gisela Striker and Melissa Barry
University of Michigan, B.A., Highest Distinction, Highest Honors in Philosophy, May 1998

AREAS OF SPECIALIZATION

Ethics and Moral Philosophy, Political Philosophy, Kant's Practical Philosophy, Philosophy of Education

AREAS OF COMPETENCE

History of Ethics, Applied Ethics, Philosophy of Religion

POST-DOCTORAL AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

Visiting Fellowship at the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Summer 2016
Non-Residential Fellowship with The Experience Project, September 2015-August 2016
Non-Residential Fellowship with The Hope and Optimism Project, September 2015-August 2016 (declined)
Visiting Fellowship at the Center for Ethics, Philosophy, and Public Affairs, University of St Andrews, Scotland, April-June 2014
Nominated for Weinberg Distinguished Teaching Award, Spring 2014
Spencer Foundation Initiative on Philosophy in Educational Policy and Practice Grant, April 2012-March 2013
Laurance S. Rockefeller Fellowship at the Princeton Center for Human Values, August 2009-July 2010
Visiting Faculty Fellowship at the Center for Ethics at the University of Toronto, 2009-2010 (declined)

PRE-DOCTORAL AWARDS AND FELLOWSHIPS

George Plimpton Adams Prize for outstanding dissertation (2007)
Whiting Dissertation Completion Fellowship (2004-2005)
Edmond J. Safra Fellowship, Center for Ethics and the Professions at Harvard University (2003-2004)
Francis Bowen Prize for the Best Paper in Moral or Political Philosophy (2004): "The Hobbesian Agent and the Bondage of Self-interest"
Francis Bowen Prize (2003): "Inner Freedom and Required Ends"
Bechtel Prize for the Best Philosophy Paper (2002): "Acting Together: Negotiation, Coercion and Joint Decision-Making"
Francis Bowen Prize (2001): "Disagreement and Liberal Commitment"
Harvey Fellowship (2001-2005)
Harvard Graduate Society Summer Fellowship (2001)
Derek Bok Center Certificate of Excellence in Teaching (2000, 2003)

William K. Frankena Award for Most Outstanding Graduate in Philosophy (1998)
Virginia Vos Award for Excellence in Academic Writing (1998)
National Finalist, British Marshall Scholarship (1997)
Elsa L. Haller Award for Best Undergraduate Paper in Philosophy (1997)
Otto Graf Scholarship for Most Outstanding Junior in the Honors College (1997)
Phi Beta Kappa (1997)

PUBLICATIONS

“Bad Debt: The Kantian Inheritance of Humean Desire,” forthcoming in *Kantian Freedom*. Dai Heide and Evan Tiffany, eds.

Kant’s claim that virtue has nothing to do with the content of our desires, but depends only on the strength of will needed to manage our desires, depends on an unattractive conception of inclination that he inherits from Hume. Kantians can replace this with a better view of desire without giving up what is most attractive about the Kantian approach: the claim that reason can motivate, and the associated illuminating account of practical freedom.

“Love and Agency,” forthcoming in *The Routledge Handbook of Love*. Adrienne Martin, ed.

Our ordinary talk reflects a deep tension in the way that we think about love. On the one hand, we regard love as an especially important expression of our agency. Yet, on the other hand, we also think of love as something that happens to us, in the face of which we are passive and can be powerless. While it’s hard to see how to hold these two ways of thinking of love together, in this paper I argue that we must find some way of doing so. I argue that we must think of love as a contentful attitude attributable to its agent, an expression of our selves. But familiar ways of understanding agency sort love into the category of things that happen to us, rather than that of things that we do: You cannot love at will, nor is love an attitude to which you could reason. I conclude that questions about the relationship of our agency to what we love are not superficial, but stem from deep tensions about the relationship between love and reasons. A resolution to these difficulties would provide important insight not only into the character of love, but also the nature of agency, and its relationship to values, reasoning and reasons.

“Beyond Words: Inarticulable Reasons and Reasonable Commitments,” forthcoming in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*.

We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. You may thereby come to embrace a value that you did not grasp prior to the experience in question. Moreover, it seems that in a large and important subset of cases you *could not have* fully appreciated that value merely by considering a report of the reasons or arguments that purport to establish that it is valuable. Despite its ubiquity, this phenomenon goes missing in a great deal of contemporary work in ethics and political philosophy. In this paper I further specify the phenomenon of interest by developing a series of examples. Then I support the claim that philosophers routinely overlook it by surveying several significant philosophical positions that do so.

“Christian Philosophy and the Christian Life,” forthcoming in *Christian Philosophy? Conceptions, Continuations, and Challenges*. J. Aaron Simmons, ed.

I consider how Christian philosophers should decide which questions are worth asking. I provide an interpretation and defense of Alvin Plantinga’s claim that Christian philosophers should strive for autonomy, and argue that this rules out some ways of settling on our questions. I then argue that the questions in which Christian philosophers should take an interest are those arising from or continuous with a distinctively Christian way of life.

“Love (of God) as a Middle Way Between Dogmatism and Hyper-rationalism in Ethics,” *Faith and Philosophy* 35:3, 2018, pp 279-298.

In the *Groundwork* Kant dismisses theistic principles, along with all other competitors to his Categorical Imperative, claiming that they are heteronomous. By contrast, he asserts, the fundamental moral principle must be a principle of autonomy. I argue that the best case for this Kantian conclusion conflates our access to the reasons for our commitments with an ability to state these reasons such that they could figure in an argument. This conflation, in turn, results from a

certain Kantian conception of inclination, and its role in our moral psychology. These are views that we ought to reject. Having done so we will see that a theistic ethics based on desire or love for God would not face a distinctive problem of heteronomy.

“Freedom and Influence in Formative Education,” in *The Oxford Handbook of Freedom*, David Schmitz and Carmen Pavel, eds. Oxford University Press, 2018.

The principle that children’s freedom should be preserved in their upbringing is sometimes thought to provide an alternative to imposing a particular conception of the good on them. But to sustain the alternative we must distinguish between those desires and proclivities that are educated into a person and those that are his own. Several philosophers appeal to innate or presocial tendencies to ground this distinction, but that approach fails. The ability to exercise first person authority over a desire or commitment provides a better conception of what it is for such a state to be one’s own. But such desires and commitments are not distinct from those educated into a person. While the ideal of autonomy, conceived in these terms, can still provide some guidance for upbringing, it will not substitute for teaching children a conception of the good.

“The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair: (Kantian) Ethics and the Need for Hope in God,” in *Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Religion, Volume 7*. Jon Kvanvig, ed. Oxford, 2015.

Kant rejects all of the standard accounts of the dependence of morality on religious claims or commitment. He nevertheless thinks that morality “leads to” religion. I defend an account of this “leading to” relationship, arguing that it is the result of Kant’s struggle to capture the practical import of the consequences of our actions within a moral theory that rejects the idea that we must maximize the good. On this view, the best way to acknowledge that the outcomes of our actions matter, while maintaining uncompromising commitment to the moral law, is to hope in God.

“Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue,” in *The Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and Justice*, Harry Brighouse and Michael MacPherson, eds. University of Chicago, 2015.

Volume awarded the **Frederick Ness Prize** for best contribution to understanding and improvement of liberal education.

Many thinkers agree that facilitating the development of students’ autonomy is a proper aim of education generally and higher education in particular. I defend a version of the autonomy view, but not as I think its other advocates imagine it. I suggest that an important aim of education is the facilitation of intellectual virtues. What is right about the idea that education should facilitate students’ autonomy is best captured in virtue terms as intellectual charity and humility

“Educating for Autonomy: An Old-fashioned View,” *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 31:1, Fall 2014, pp 257-275.

Also published in *Education: Ideals and Practices*, David Schmitz, ed. Cambridge, 2014.

I argue that we cannot adequately characterize the aims of education in terms of some formal conception of what it is to think well. Implementing any such aim requires reliance on and communication of further, substantive normative commitments. This reveals that a standard contrast between an old-fashioned approach to education that aims to communicate a particular normative outlook, and a progressive approach that aims to develop skills of critical reasoning and reflection is confused and misleading.

“Moral Education in the Liberal State,” *Journal of Practical Ethics*, 1:2, December 2013, 34-63.

I argue that political liberals should not support the monopoly of a single educational approach in state sponsored schools, but should allow reasonable citizens latitude to choose the worldview in which their own children are educated.

“Dealing With the Past: Responsibility and Personal History,” *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 164:1, 2013, 141-161.

I argue that unfortunate formative circumstances do not undermine the warrant for either responsibility or blame. I then diagnose the tendency to think that formative circumstances do matter in this way, arguing that knowledge of these circumstances can play an essential epistemic role in our interpersonal interactions.

“Kant’s Political Philosophy,” *Philosophy Compass* vol. 7:12, November 2012, 896-909.

In the first half of the essay I give a reading of Kant’s argument for the obligation to found the state: Each person has an innate right to freedom, but it is possible to simultaneously honor everyone’s right only under the rule of law. So we are obligated to submit to the authority of the state if we have one, and to establish one if we do not. In the second half I survey four points of controversy: (1) What is the relationship between Kant’s political philosophy and his moral philosophy? (2) How does the innate right to freedom support the postulate that we are permitted to acquire property and other private rights? (3) How does the postulate support an obligation to found the state? (4) How should we understand Kant’s views about political revolutions?

“Kantian Ethics,” in Christian Miller, ed. *The Continuum Companion to Ethics*, (Continuum 2012).

I articulate and defend the most central claims of contemporary Kantian moral theory. I also explain some of the most important internal disagreements in the field, contrasting two approaches to Kantian ethics: Kantian Constructivism and Kantian Realism. I connect the former to Kant’s Formula of Universal Law and the latter to his Formula of Humanity. I end by discussing applications of the Formula of Humanity in normative ethics.

“Kantianism” in *The Encyclopedia of Applied Ethics*. 2nd edition. (Elsevier 2012).

This article focuses largely on Kant’s *Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals*. I also discuss Kant’s later moral works in which he defends government authority, develops a theory of virtue, and argues that moral commitment leads the rational person to religious commitment.

“Critical Notice of Arthur Ripstein’s *Force and Freedom*” (article length, peer reviewed), *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, vol. 41:4, December 2011, 549-573.

Ripstein’s Kantian argument for the authority of the state purports to demonstrate that state authority is a necessary condition of each individual’s freedom. Ripstein regards an individual as free just in case her entitlement to control what is hers is not violated. After questioning whether his approach adequately distinguishes standards of legitimacy from standards of ideal justice, I argue for the superiority of an alternative conception of freedom. On the view that I defend a person is free just in case she is able to move her body in space unimpeded by others. I argue that this conception allows for a more convincing version of the Kantian argument.

“Awarding Custody: Children’s Interests and the Fathers’ Rights Movement,” *Public Affairs Quarterly*, vol. 24:4, October 2010, 257-278.

Child custody cases in the United States are usually settled by appeal to what is taken to be in the children’s best interests. A growing movement for fathers’ rights asserts that an explicit recognition of parental rights should replace this standard, and further that this should lead us to favor split custody arrangements. I argue for the first part of the claim, appealing to the fundamental commitments of political liberalism. But I argue against the idea that this should make a 50/50 split the default custody arrangement. I explain how this proposal would license ongoing, intrusive state intervention, and so undermine the very parental rights it aims to recognize.

“The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement,” *The Philosophical Quarterly* vol. 60:238, January 2010, 50-71.

I argue that Rawls’ requirement that citizens of liberal democracies support only policies that they believe can be justified in public reason depends on a certain ideal for the relationships between citizens. I affirm the value of this ideal, and thus hold that citizens have reasons to try to achieve it. But I argue that it is not always possible to find the common ground that we would need to do so, and thus reject Rawls’ strong claim that we have an *obligation* to defend our views in public reason.

“Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature,” *Philosophers’ Imprint* vol. 9:8, August 2009.

I attempt to vindicate our authority to create new practical reasons for others by making choices of our own. In *The Doctrine of Right* Kant argues that we have an obligation to leave the Juridical State of Nature and found the state. In a less familiar passage in *Religion within the Bounds of Mere Reason* he argues for an obligation to leave what he calls the Ethical State of Nature and join together in the Moral Community. I read both texts as addressing and trying to resolve a tension between our individual freedom and our authority to make claims on one another. I explicate the

political argument, and then develop the view that Kant sketches in the *Religion*, arguing that regarding others as capable of making choices that give you reasons to act is a condition of the full exercise of your autonomy.

“Against Beneficence: A Normative Account of Love,” *Ethics* vol. 119:1, October 2008, 142-170.

I argue that rather than aiming at the well-being of those whom we love, we should aim to share in their ends. The former stance runs the risk of being objectionably paternalistic and, as I explain, only the latter makes reciprocal relationships possible. I end by diagnosing our attraction to the idea that we should promote our loved-ones’ well-being.

Book Reviews

Julia Markovits, *Moral Reason*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*. December 3, 2014.

Thomas E. Hill, *Virtue, Rules, and Justice: Kantian Aspirations*. *Mind* vol. 122:488, 2013, 1098-1102.

Hubert Dreyfus and Sean Dorrance Kelly, *All Things Shining*. *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews*, September 9, 2011.

Bennett Helm, *Love, Friendship and the Self*. *Ethics* vol. 121:4, July 2011, 808-812.

Blog Posts

“More than Words Can Say: Inarticulacy and Normative Commitment,” *Pea Soup*, June 24, 2015.
<http://peasoup.typepad.com/peasoup/2015/06/more-than-words-can-say-on-inarticulacy-and-normative-commitment-by-kyla-ebels-duggan.html>

“How Not to Solve the Liberal Dilemma of Child-Rearing” *Philosophy-her*, August 14, 2014.
<http://politicalphilosopher.net/2014/08/15/featured-philosophy-her-kyla-ebels-duggan/>

WORKS IN PROGRESS

Reasonable Commitments and Inarticulacy about Value (under contract with OUP)

Experiences of value play a central role in providing reasons for our normative commitments. It is more common to hold such commitments on the basis of experience than to embrace them simply because one is convinced by some argument. Love for another person on the basis of direct experience and appreciation of him is a paradigm example. But the reasons that these experiences provide standardly outstrip any attempts to capture them in propositional form. Thus we can have good reason to value what we do, while being incapable of saying what these reasons are. To the extent that we are thus inarticulate about our reasons they cannot be fully communicated to others. This has important, and underappreciated, implications in moral and political philosophy. It places limits on the possibility of interpersonal justification in both personal and political contexts, and has related implications for the communication of values in moral education.

Normativity and Agency: Themes from the Work of Christine M. Korsgaard, coedited with Tamar Schapiro and Sharon Street (under contract with OUP)

“On Dignity and Consequences” for the *Norton Introduction to Ethics*, Elizabeth Harman and Alex Guererro, eds.

“Morality, Love and the Value of Humanity,” for *Essays on the Value of Humanity*. Sarah Buss and Nandi Theunissen, eds.

I argue that we learn the moral attitude and grasp the reasons for it through experiences of loving individuals. In interpersonal love we appreciate the value of individual persons directly. This grasp of value plays an indispensable role in our moral convictions. Thus, though we have sufficient reasons for our moral commitments, we cannot reason to them. No argument addressing the moral skeptic, of the kind that moral philosophers have traditionally sought, is available.

Review of Mark Murhphy’s *God’s Own Ethics for Faith and Philosophy*

PRESENTATIONS

TBD

Kant and Confucianism, Seoul, South Korea, September 2019

UW-Madison Philosophy Department Colloquium, Madison WI, December 2018

“How to Have Reasons for Your Values”

Philosophy of Education Society of North America (PESNA), Mundelein IL, October 2018

Society of Christian Philosophers, Grand Rapids MI, September 2018

EDGe Workshop, Ann Arbor, MI, April 2018

“Learning What is Good”

Workshop on the Arts, the Sciences, and Human Betterment, Madison WI, July 2018

“Morality, Love, and the Value of Humanity”

Boston University Workshop in Late Modern Philosophy, Boston MA, February 2018

Arizona Workshop in Normative Ethics (WINE), Tuscon AZ, January 2018

Keynote Address, Society of Christian Philosophers Eastern Regional Meeting, Asbury University, Wilmore KY, September 2017

UK Kant Society, Conference on Kant and Contemporary Philosophy, St Andrews UK, September 2017

Wheaton Political Theory Workshop, Wheaton IL, July 2017

Other Minds/Other Wills Workshop, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL, June 2017

Northwestern University Practical Workshop, Evanston, IL, May 2017

“Autonomy in Education”

Society of Christian Philosophers, Dallas TX, November 2017

“Love, Reasons and Reasoning”

Normativity Working Group (GRIN), McGill University, Montreal, Quebec, March 2017

“Inarticulacy and Reasonable Commitments”

Purdue University, West Lafayette IN, September 2016

Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, July 2016

Florida State University, Tallahassee FL, April 2016

Auburn University Philosophy Conference, Auburn AL, March 2016

Moral and Philosophy Workshop, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA, March 2016

Work in Progress Series, MIT, Cambridge MA, March 2016

Transformative Experiences Working Group, University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill (by video-conference), February 2016

University of Chicago Practical Workshop, Chicago IL, February 2016

“Bad Debt: The Kantian Inheritance of Humean Desire”

Awesome Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Canberra Australia, July 2016

Dartmouth College, Hanover NH, May 2015

3rd Annual Tennessee Value and Agency Conference, Knoxville TN, November 2014

Invited Address, Conference on Kantian Freedom, Simon Fraser University, Vancouver BC, October 2014

“The Inarticulate First Person”

Moral, Political, and Social Thought Seminar, Australian National University, Canberra, Australia, July 2016

“Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue”

Society for Applied Philosophy Meetings at the Eastern APA, Washington DC, January 2016

Honors Residential College, Baylor University, Waco TX, February 2013

Spencer Foundation Conference on Achieving the Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and Justice, Evanston IL, October 2011

Spencer Foundation Workshop on Achieving the Aims of Higher Education: Problems of Morality and Justice, Chicago IL, June 2011

“On Love”

Center for Christian Thought, Biola University, La Miranda CA, November 2015

“Love (of God) as a Middle Way Between Dogmatism and Hyperrationalism in Ethics”

Theistic Ethics Workshop, Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem NC, October 2015

“Freedom and Influence in Formative Education”

Wheaton Political Theory Workshop, Wheaton IL, July 2015

“Moral Community: Escaping the Ethical State of Nature”

Georgetown Moral Innovation Seminar, Washington DC, October 2014

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, September 2005

“The Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair: (Kantian) Ethics and the Need for Hope in God”

University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews UK, April 2014

University of Illinois-Chicago, Chicago IL, April 2014

University of Notre Dame, South Bend IN, December 2013

Baylor University, Waco TX, February 2013

“Christian Philosophy and the Christian Life”

Keynote Address, Society of Christian Philosophers Midwest Meeting, Palos Heights IL, March 2014

“What Philosophy of Education Can Teach Us about the Virtues”

Conference on Education: Ideals and Practices, Park City, UT, August 2013

Conference on Educating for Intellectual Virtues, Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles CA, June 2013

“Kant on Morality, Happiness, and Religion”

Baylor-Georgetown-Notre Dame Conference on Philosophy of Religion, San Antonio TX, November 2012

Southern North American Kant Society, Tulsa OK, September 2012

International Symposium on the Foundations of Morality, Wuhan, China, October 2011

Felician Ethics Conference, Rutherford NJ, April 2011

Wheaton College Philosophy Speaker Series, Wheaton IL, January 2011

“Dealing with the Past: Responsibility and Personal History”

Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, Boulder CO, August 2012

Bellingham Summer Philosophy Conference, Bellingham WA, July 2012

University of Chicago Practical Workshop, Chicago IL, December 2011

Indiana University, Bloomington IN, March 2010

Mid-Atlantic Reading Group in Ethics, New York NY, February, 2010

Fellows Seminar, Center for Human Values, Princeton University, Princeton NJ, February 2010

“Moral Education in the Liberal State”

The Society for Applied Philosophy Conference, Oxford, England, UK June 2012

The Virtue of Justice Conference, Conway AR, March 2012

Northwestern Practical Philosophy Workshop, Evanston IL, May 2011

Vanderbilt Political Theory Workshop, Nashville TN, September 2010

Northeastern Political Science Association Meeting, Philadelphia, PA, November 2009

“Taking Responsibility”

American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2010

Conference on Developing Character: Moral and Intellectual Virtues, Dubuque IA, March 2007

Grand Valley State University, Allendale MI, March 2007

Notre Dame Center for Ethics and Culture, Conference on Modernity, South Bend IN, November 2006

“Kant on Freedom and the Development of Character”

UK Kant Society Conference on Kant and Society, Lancaster, England, UK, July 2009

“Anselmian Moral Skepticism”

University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee WI, April 2009

University of British Columbia, Vancouver BC, January 2009

Baylor University, Waco TX, December 2008

“Children’s Interests and the Fathers’ Rights Movement”

American Philosophical Association, Central Division, Chicago IL, February 2009

Grand Valley State University Philosophy Club, Allendale MI, March 2007

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, April 2006

“Inner Freedom and Required Ends”

North American Kant Society Midwest Study Group, Milwaukee WI, November 2006

Boston University, Graduate Student Conference on Kant, Boston MA, April 2004

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, February 2003

“Against Beneficence”

Northwestern University, Evanston IL, February 2006

University of Illinois-Urbana Champaign, Champaign IL, February 2006

University of Massachusetts-Amherst, Amherst MA, February 2006

University of Vermont, Burlington VT, February 2006

Bowdoin College, Brunswick ME, February 2006

University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia PA, February 2006

University of Notre Dame, South Bend IN, January 2006

University of Western Ontario, London ON, January 2006

MIT Workshop on Gender and Philosophy, Cambridge MA, January 2006

Harvard Department of Philosophy, Cambridge MA, November 2005

“Relationships as Sharing Ends”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, April 2005

“The Problem with Taking Care of What We Care About”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, October 2004

“The Beginning of Community: Politics in the Face of Disagreement”

Center for Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University, Cambridge MA, May 2004

“Sovereign Autonomy and Interpersonal Authority”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, April 2004

“Conservative Christians as Political Liberals”

Baylor University, Conference on Christianity and the Soul of the University, Waco TX, March 2004

“The Hobbesian Agent and the Bondage of Self-Interest”

Center for Ethics and the Professions, Harvard University, Cambridge MA, January 2004

“Two States of Nature”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, October 2003

“Autonomy and Others’ Authority”

University of California-Irvine, Graduate Student Colloquium, Irvine CA, November 2002

“Acting Together: Negotiation, Coercion, and Joint Decision-Making”

University of California-Irvine, Graduate Student Colloquium, Irvine CA, May 2002

University of California-Los Angeles Workshop in Moral Philosophy, Los Angeles CA, May 2002

“Commitment to Principles and Persons”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, October 2001

“Disagreement and Liberal Commitment”

Harvard Workshop in Moral and Political Philosophy, Cambridge MA, February 2001

COMMENTS

Anthony Laden, “Two Concepts of Civility”

Philosophy of Education Society of North America (PESNA), Mundelein, IL, October 2018

Aleksy Tarasenko-Struc, “Objectification, Domination, and the Objective Stance”

Bechtel Reunion Workshop, Evanston IL, September 2018

Nomy Arpaly, “In Defense of Benevolence”

Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP), Evanston IL, May 2016

Kristi Olsen, “The Anatomy of Envy-Freeness”

Bechtel Workshop, Boston MA, June 2015

Allen Wood, “Universal Law”

Paton Colloquium in Kantian Ethics, St Andrews UK, May 2014

Patrick Kain, “Good, God, and Kant”

Baylor-Georgetown-Notre Dame Conference on Philosophy of Religion, South Bend IN, October 2013

Ian MacMullen, “Status Quo Bias,” *Civics Beyond Critics*, Chapter 7.

Book Manuscript Workshop, St. Louis MO, September 2013

Harry Brighouse, “What Are Educational Goods and How Should They Be Distributed?”

Conference on Moral Education: Ancient and Contemporary, Evanston IL, June 2013

Michelle Mason, “Love, Benevolence, and How to Share a Beloved’s Ends”

Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP) *Conference*, Evanston IL, May 2013

John Hare, “Kant and the Notion of Conscience”

Conference on Challenges to Religious and Moral Belief: Disagreement and Evolution, Indianapolis IN, September 2012.

Mary Clayton Coleman, “Yes, Virginia, There is a Genuinely Metanormative Constructivism”

American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting, Chicago IL, February 2012

Sharon Anderson-Gold, “The Metaphysics of Marriage: Kant on Real Personal Rights”

First Bi-Annual Meeting of the North American Kant Society, Urbana-Champaign IL, June 2011

David Sussman, “Korsgaard on the Reality of Pain”

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston IL, May 2010

Abe Roth, “Can Shared Activity Simply Be Willed?”

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston IL, April 2009

Edward Hinchman, “Receptivity and the Will”

Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston IL, May 2008

Helga Varden, “Kant’s Non-Absolutist Conception of Political Legitimacy”

American Philosophical Association, Central Division Meeting, Chicago IL, April 2008

Helga Varden, "International Political Obligation"
Northwestern University Society for Ethical Theory and Political Philosophy Conference, Evanston IL,
May 2007

Richard Galvin, "The Practical Contradiction Interpretation Reconsidered"
American Philosophical Association, Pacific Division Meeting, San Francisco CA, April 2007

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Northwestern University Courses Taught:

Graduate Seminars

Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory*, Spring 2019

Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Love, Reasons and Reasoning*, Winter 2017 (Taught concurrently at the University of Chicago as Phil 50101.)

Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Limits of Articulacy*, Spring 2016

Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Desires*, Winter 2015

Phil 402: *Proseminar: Kantian Ethics*, Fall 2013-Winter 2014

Phil 488: *Professional Skills Seminar*, Spring 2013

Phil 460: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Virtue Ethics*, Winter 2012

Phil 410: *Special Topics in Philosophy: Kant's Political Theory*, Fall 2010

Phil 477: *Seminar in Moral Theory: Moral Skepticism*, Fall 2008

Phil 410: *Special Topics in Philosophy: Responsibility*, Fall 2007

Advanced Undergraduate Classes

Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Contemporary Moral Theory*, Winter 2009; Spring 2011; Fall 2018

Phil 363: *Kant's Moral Theory*, Winter 2011; Spring 2013; Spring 2015

Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Philosophy of Education*, Fall 2013

Phil 360: *Topics in Moral Theory: Kant's Moral Theory*, Spring 2007

Introductory Classes

Phil 109: *Freshman Seminar: Plato on Tyranny and Democracy*, Fall 2017

Phil 273-2: *Brady Scholars Seminar: The Moral Life*, Winter 2012; Winter 2014; Winter 2015; Winter 2016; Fall 2016; Winter 2018; Winter 2019

Phil 240: *Freedom and Responsibility*, Spring 2015

Phil 109: *Freshman Seminar: If God is Dead, Is All Permitted?* Spring 2011

Phil 264: *Classics of Political Theory*, Spring 2009

Phil 263: *Classics of Moral Theory*, Spring 2008

Graduate Advising

I have served or am serving as chair of the following students' dissertation committees, or am currently their first or second year graduate advisor. Doctoral defense dates and current positions are indicated in parentheses.

Christiana Eltiste (first year)

Regina Hurley (second year)

Carmen DeSchryver (third year)

Susan Bencomo (ABD)

Josh Kissel (ABD)

Abigail Bruxvoort (ABD)

Hao Liang (ABD)

Jessica Talamantez (ABD)

Raffanna Donelson (2017, Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Law at Louisiana State University)

I have served or am serving on the following students' dissertation committees.

Robert Carry Osborne (ABD)

Andrew Hull (ABD)

William Cochran (ABD)

Cristina Carrillo (ABD)

Francey Russell (2017, degree from the University of Chicago, Postdoctoral Associate and Lecturer in the Humanities, Yale University)
Carlos Pereira di Salvo (2017, Visiting Assistant Professor, University of Pennsylvania)
Amy Flowerree (2017, Postdoctoral Fellow at University of Cologne Center for Epistemology and the Kantian Tradition, Assistant Professor at Texas Tech)
Meg Schmitt (2017, degree from University of Notre Dame)
Chelsea Egbert (2016)
Seth Mayer (2015, Assistant Professor at Manchester University, IN)
Tyler Zimmer (2014, Instructor at Northeastern Illinois University and Northwestern University)
Oksana Maksymchuk (2013, Assistant Professor at the University of Arkansas)
Emilie Pratico (2013, Manager at the Business for Social Responsibility, Paris)
Christina Drogalis (2013, degree from Loyola University, Chicago)
Heidi Giannini (2013, degree from Baylor University, Assistant Professor at Hope College)
Max Cherem (2012, Assistant Professor at Kalamazoo College)
B. Scott Rouse (2011, Research Consultant with Pluralistic Networks)
Laura Papish (2010, Assistant Professor at George Washington University)
Kelby Harrison (2010, Director of LGBT Resource Center, University of Southern California)
Brad Cokelet (2008, Assistant Professor at Kentucky University)

Undergraduate Thesis Supervision

Steven Bennett (2016-2017)
Benjamin Rudofsky (2010-2011)

Harvard University Tutorials:

I designed and independently taught these semester-long seminars for undergraduate philosophy majors.

Phil 97hf: *Applied Ethics: Commodification*, Fall 2005
Phil 98hf: *Morality and Practical Reason*, Fall 2004
Phil 98hf: *Hobbes' Leviathan*, Fall 2003
Phil 97hf: *Plato's Republic*, Fall 2001
Phil 97hf and Phil 98hf: *Theology and Moral Theory*, Spring 2000

Harvard University Teaching Fellowships:

I planned and led sections, graded papers, and held office hours for these lecture courses.

Phil 175: *Ethical Theory*, Melissa Barry, Spring 2003
Phil 102: *Aristotle*, Gisela Striker, Fall 2001
MR 66: *Moral Reasoning About Social Protest*, Susanna Siegel, Fall 2000

SERVICE

Departmental Service

Director of Graduate Studies and Chair of Graduate Studies Committee (2018-2019)
Search Committee in Ancient Philosophy (2017-2018)
Undergraduate Studies Committee (2017-2018)
Speakers Committee (2008-2009, 2010-2011, 2016-2017, 2017-2018 (chair))
Faculty Liaison for Departmental Climate Committee (2014-2015; 2017-2018)
Search Committee in Political Philosophy and Race Theory (2016-2017)
Graduate Admissions Committee (2013-2014)
Ad Hoc Committee for Program Review (2013-2014)
Assessments Committee (2012-2013)
Search Committee in Moral and Political Philosophy (2011-2012)
Search Committee in 19th Century German Philosophy (2008-2009)
Undergraduate Studies Committee (Spring 2008)
Graduate Representative to Faculty (2000-2001)
Co-organizer of Harvard-MIT Graduate Conference (1999-2000)

University Service

Delegate to Foundational Disciplines Convention (2018)
Curricular Review Committee (2014-2016; 2017-2018)
Brady Program Faculty Advisory Board (2013-2018)

NEH Summer Stipend Review Committee (2015)
Appointments Committee for Visiting Brady Scholar (2011-2012; 2012-2013)

Professional Service

Ethics Area Editor, *Ergo*
Executive Board Member, Society of Christian Philosophers, (2018-2021)
Diversity Committee Member, Society of Christian Philosophers (2018-2021)
Board of Editorial Consultants, *Faith and Philosophy*
SSHRC External Assessor (2017-2018)
Book Referee for *Oxford University Press*
Journal Referee for *Philosophers' Imprint*, *The Philosophical Quarterly*, *The Journal of Ethics*, *Public Affairs Quarterly*, *Mind*, *Philosophical Studies*, *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *Ethics*, *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, *American Philosophical Quarterly*, *Res Philosophica*, *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, *Kantian Review*, *Philosophy Compass*, *Journal of Moral Philosophy*, *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*
Reviewer for Spencer Foundation's IPEPP Small Grants Program (2014-2015)
Co-organizer of Annual Northwestern University Society for the Theory of Ethics and Politics (NUSTEP) Conference (2006-present)